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of the State of Utah
RICHARD P. HAMPTON, and PATRICIA
L. HAMPTON, his wife,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
-v-

STATE UTAH: UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION; ERNEST H. BALCH,
ELIAS J. STRONG; FRANCIS FELTCH;
W. J. SMIRL; AMES K. BAGLEY;
UT AH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HIGHWAYS; C. TAYLOR BURTON,

Case No.
10997

DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellants initiated suit against the State ot
Utah, the Utah State Road Commission, the Utah
3tate Department of Highways, the Director of the
Utah State Department of Highways, and the individual members of the Utah State Road Commission, wherein appellants sought to recover damages allegedly resulting from certain construction
a.ctivities adjacent to appellants' property or, in the
, lternative, to enjoin respondents from such activ-
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ities. The activities giving rise to appellants' action
consisted of the construction of an access control
fence and guard rail facility on property not owned
or claimed by appellants but adjacent thereto.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Subsequent to the filing of appellants' complaint, respondents sought a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the lower court lacked jurisdiction
over respondents on the grounds and for the
reasons that the respondents were immune from
suit. After some delay, the lower court entered a
ruling dismissing appellants' complaint on the
merits and with prejudice.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the dismissal of appel·
lants' complaint should be affirmed.

ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents basically agree with the statemen1
of facts as set forth in appellants' brief. However,
the following summary of the allegations contained
in appellants' complaint should be noted. Count 1·
of appellants' complaint seeks damages allegedlv
caused by the negligent, careless and reckless man
ner in which the construction activities were accom
plished. Count II of appellants' complaint alleges an
easement of ingress and egress acquired by appel
lants through the use of the public street abuttinc
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the front of appellant's property. Count II further
alleges that the construction of the access contrcl
fence and guard rail facility reduced or destroyed
the effectiveness of this easement. Count III of appellants' complaint alleges a nuisance theory and
Count IV alleges fee tittle to appellants to the
middle of the public highway abutting the front of
appellants' property. Count V of appellants' complaint seeks an injunction against respondents to
enjoin respondents from further interfering with
appellants' alleged right of access and easement,
an order requiring respondents to remove the access control fence and guard rail facility constructed adjacent to appellants' property, or, in the alternative, an order requiring respondents to institute
condemnation proceedings to assess the damages
and compensation due appellants by virtue of the
construction activities.
It must be noted that at the time service of
process was executed on respondents, October 28,
1964, the alleged interferences with appellants'
property rights, i.e., the access control fence and
the guard rail facility, were an accomplished fact.
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT.
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MERITS
OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS NECESSARY
TO IDENTIFY AND RECOGNIZE THE TYPE
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OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR INTEREST ALLEGEDLY APPROPRIATED BY RESPONDENTS.
B. THE ALLEGED DAMAGES COMPLAINED
OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED BY
APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT
MERIT AND MAY BE DISPOSED OF SUMMARILY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMIS·
SING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT.
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MERITS
OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS NECESSARY
TO IDENTIFY AND RECOGNIZE THE TYPE
OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR INTEREST ALLEGEDLY APPROPRIATED BY RESPONDENTS.

Respondents agree with appellants that, for the
purposes of an appeal arising from the granting of
a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the
facts as set forth in appellants' complaint. Hurst v. ,
Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2nd 153, 397 P.2d 71 (1964).
Initially, however, respondents submit that as a
matter of law, respondents are immune from suit
in each and every allegation contained in appellants' complaint and that appellants totally fail to
state a cause of action on which relief may be
granted.
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To adequately consider the merits of the instant case, it is necessary that appellants' pleadings
be examined to determine the type of property right
or interest allegedly appropriated by respondents.
In this regard, it is of the utmost importance to recognize that appellants do not allege the taking of
any real property contained within the legal description of appellants' property deed. Therefore,
the only possible property rights or interest that
have allegedly been appropriated by respondents
are, (1) the alleged impairment of ingress and egress
to appellants' property and (2) the allegation that
appellants owned the public street abutting the
front of their property to the center line and that respondents have appropriated a portion of that street
so owned by appellants.
As to the allegation that appellants own the
public street abutting the front of their property to
the center line, respondent submits that such allegation is tota.lly without merit. This allegation is
evidently based on the incorrect assumption that
there has been an abandonment of the public street
abutting the front of appellants' property. The
lower court did not err in refusing to consider this
allegation because there has been no abandonment
as a matter of law.
Therefore. based on the pleadings, the type of
property right or interest allegedly appropriated by
respondents is the alleged damage to or desruction
of appellants' claimed easement of ingress and
egress.

B. THE ALLEGED DAMAGES COMPLAINED
OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW.

It must first be noted that for the purposes of
this appeal, respondents are willing to concede that
whatever damages appellants could prove by virtue of the alleged interference with the easement
of access could be considered compensable under
the damage provision of Utah Const. Art. I § 22.
However, this concession does not alleviate the
problem for the instant case raises the issue as to
the proper procedure to be pursued by appellants
in satisfying their claim. Respondents submit that
if compensation is due appellants, it must come
from the Utah State Board of Examiners and the
Utah State Legislature, and not through the courts.

A distinction has developed between private
property taken for public use and private property
damaged by and through public use. This basic
distinction has further developed into a segregation of the remedial procedures available to an aggrieved party.
This developed distinction, which has evolved
into the established law in this jurisdiction, had as
its inception the eloquent dissent of Chief Justice
Wolfe in State by State Road Comm'n v. District
Court. Fourth Judicial District. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d
502 (1937). In that case the court considered the
construction by the Utah State Road Commission
of a viaduct structure that deprived the abutting
landowners of convenient access, light, air, and

view (94 Utah 388). The court concluded that although the Utah State Road Commission, as an
agency of the State of Utah, was immune from suit,
the individual road commissioners could be enjoined from the alleged infliction of consequential
damages on the basis that Utah Const. art I § 22,
was self-executing (94 Utah 397). In his dissent, Chief
Justice Wolfe took the authoritative position that
Utah Const. art. I, § 22, was substantive and not procedural. As justification for this position the Chief
Justice reasoned that while compensation is gUaranteed by that constitutional provision the procedure to be employed in satisfying the compensation requirement is not set forth. That constitutional
provision does not guarantee that compensation
shall be first paid before damage occurs. It guarantees only that upon damage, compensation will
be paid.
In discussing the evolution of the definition of
the terms "taken or damaged" as found in Utah
Const. art. I, § 22, Chief Justice Wolfe recognized
that prior to 1870, only the word "taking" was included within the constitutional provisions. This
necessitated an expansion of the definition of the
word "taken" to include instances of not only a
physical take, but also cases where the use or enjoyment of the property was so impaired as to be
tantamount to a take. However, because of the subsequent inclusion of the word "damaged" in state
constitutions, it became necessary to maintain the
expanded definition of the word "taken."
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As stated by Chief Justice Wolfe at 94 Utah 408:
The remedy to prevent a 'taking' without agreed
compensation or condemnation would be inunction
because such taking would be without authority.
The remedy for damages caused by an agency of
the State performing its functions would be enforced as it is enforced in all other cases against
the State where remedy is not specifically given by
statute, to wit, by resort to the board of examiners.

In summarizing his position, Chief Justice Wolfe
stated at 94 Utah 434, 435:
Sec. 22, Art. I, of our Constitution, guarantees persons whose property is taken or damaged for public
use just compensation, but there is no guarantee
that compensation be first paid before the damage.
*

* *

Whether the Road Commissioners were suable depends upon whether they were in fact acting lawfully for a state agency authorized to do the work
the Road Commissioners were doing.
The Road Commissioners were not acting outside
of their authority when they, by constructing the
viaduct on the state highway, caused consequential
injuries to abutting owners as described in the complaint for an injunction.
The Road Commission is subject to the due process
clauses of both Federal and our State Constitutions, but if the use is a public one the fact that
proprietors whose property is "damaged" consequential to an improvement of the highway by the
Road Commission, as distinguished from a "taking,"
are compelled to go to the Board of Examiners for
inquiry and ascertainment of the damage instead of
a court, does not withdraw from such proprietors
the orotection of fh1e nrof'eRf;
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This distinction between the "taking" and
"damaging" of property reecived recognition in
State by State Road Comm'n v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah
464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941), wherein this court stated
at 101 Utah 467:
To the extent that the present taking or construction so violates condemnee's rights, he is entitled
to recover; but be the loss what it may it must
have a causal connection with the taking of the
property or the construction thereon. [Emphasis
added.]

Several recent cases also serve to illustrate this
distinction. In Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10
Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960), this court considered an action by abutting property owners for
damages accruing when the Utah State Road Commission constructed a highway project on a reduced grade of sixteen feet below the abutting
property. This court held that sovereign immunity
constituted a bar to the action.
In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah
2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), this court held that mandamus would not be available to compel the individual members of the Utah State Road Commission to initiate condemnation proceedings for
damages allegedly caused by the impairment of the
ingress to and egress from private property.
In State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585
0 962), the fundamental question was whether the
State was suable for consequential damages to
prooerty not souqht for condemnation. This court

concluded that the State was not suable under the
circumstances and also recognized the necessity of
a causal connection between an impairment of ingress and egress and the actual physical taking of
property.
Also, in Hurst v. Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153.
397 P.2d 71 (1964), this court held that sovereign
immunity was a bar to an action for damages and
injunctive relief against the operation of a gravel pit
belonging to the State and allegedly constituting a
nuisance. See also Sine v. Helland, 18 Utah 2d 222,
418 P.2d 979 (1966).
The common denominator in these cases is the
fact that there was not an actual physical appropriation of private property. Rather, the damages resulted from operations and activities adjacent to the
private property. In every instance, this court concluded that judicial recourse was not available to
the aggrieved party. These findings illustrate and
solidify the position taken by Chief Justice Wolfe
in State by State Road Comm'n v. District County,
Fourth Judicial District, supra, that Utah Const. art. I,
§ 22, is substantive and not procedural. If Utah
Const. art.I, § 22, was procedural, judicial recourse
would be aavilable to the aggrieved party. However, this is clearly not the case.
The next consideration is whether Utah Const.
art. I, § 22, is self-executing. This consideration is
basically intertwined with the consideration as to
whether the constitutional provision is substantive
or procedural in that, if it is found to be self-execut-

'

I'

mg, 1t must necessarily be a_ foundation on which to
justify judicial review.
This consideration was adequately answered m
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County. supra. wherein this
court stated at 354 P.2d 106:
. . . consistently and historically we have ruled that
the State may not be sued without its consent;
taken the view that Art. I, Sec. 22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it give consent
to be sued, implied or otherwise; and that to secure
such consent is a legislative matter, a principle
recognized by the legislature itself.

The above-cited cases have established that the
term "taken" as found in Utah Const. art. I § 22, is
applicable only where there has been a direct physical appropriation of private property. Where there
is a direct physical appropriation of private property without just compensation, judicial review may
arguably be available to the aggrieved party because the state agency, in so acting, did so without
authority. However, where private property is consequentially damaged by virtue of the construction_
of a public improvement, judicial review is not
available to the aggrieved party. Under such circumstances, the proper course of procedure is to
present the matter to the Utah State Board of Examinters and the Utah State Legislature.
A full recitation of authorities is not necessary
for the proposition that the Utah State Road Commission, as an agency of the State of Utah, is immune from suit until consent is given. It is also well
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established that Utah Const. art. I, § 22, does not
operate as either an express or implied waiver of
immunity. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra.
To this principle is added the proposition that a
suit against a public officer is in reality a suit against
the State unless the public officer acted beyond the
scope of his authority. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah
483, 134 Pac. 626 (1913). There being no conceivable basis on which to say the construction of the
access control fence and guard rail facility were
not accomplished pursuant to the authority vested
in respondents, the instant case is obviously a suit
directed against agencies and public officers vested
with sovereign immunity.
In summary, respondents submit that the instant case does not present a situation whereby pri
vate property has been taken, physically appropriated, for a public improvement without just compensation. If such was the case, a suit may arguably
be maintained because respondents acted beyond
the scope of their authority. However, in the instant case, the situation is one of an alleged damage to an access easement. The firmly imbedded
doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes judicial ,
intervention in matters involving consequential
damages of this nature. Utah Const. art. I, § 22, is
substantive and not procedural, and also not selfexecuting and does not serve as a foundation on
which to predicate judicial review. Absent a
physical appropriation, the only recourse available
to appellants is a presentation of their claim to the
Utah State Board of Examiners and the Utah State

i3

Legislature. This court has no alternative but to affirm the lower court's dismissal of appellants' complaint.
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED BY
APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT
MERIT AND MAY BE DISPOSED OF SUMMARILY.

In the course of their brief, appellants make certain assertions which respondents submit are totally
without merit. In an effort not to overburden this
court with undue rhetoric, respondents will attempt
to summarily dispose of these issues.
Appellants allege that the instant case comes
within the purview of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (Supp.
1967). However, appellants fail to recognize that the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act applies only to
claims and actions arising after July 1, 1966. The
construction activities complained of by appellants,
i.e., the construction of the access control fence and
guard rail facility, were accomplished facts in October of 1964 when service of process was executed
on the respondent. Therefore, appellants' claim
arose before July 1, 1966.
Also, it must be noted that appellants' reliance
on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is defeated by the provisions of the act itself. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 1967), requires that a claim
against the State must be preceded by notice thereof Hled with the Attorney General of the State of
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Utah and that such claim is forever barred unless
the notice is filed within one year after the cause
of action arises. Appellants' allege to have given
notice to the State of Utah in 1964, but fail to appreciated that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
was nonexistent in 1964. Thus, even if the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act applied to the facts of
the instant case, which respondents' vigorously
deny, it must be conceded that the appellants have
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in
filing a proper notice with the Utah State Attorney
General's office for consideration of their claim. '
The notice given in 1964 is insuffilcient to comply
with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which was not effective until July 1.
1966.
It may also be noted that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides a blanket immunity
to all governmental entities except as that immunity is withdrawn by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3) (Supp.
1967). The type of action pursued by appellant Jn
. the instant case, not specifically exempted from the
blanket of immunity, is barred.

One additional problem must be considered
in that appellants seek to enjoin the individual
members of the Utah State Road Commission. Appellants' reliance on State by State Road Comm'n
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, is obvious. The justification given by this court in the
issuance of the injunction in that case was on the
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theory that Utah Const. art. I,§ 22, was self-executing
(94 Utah 397). As noted above, Mr. Chief Justice
Wolfe logically annihilated the justification given
by the majority based principally on the fact that
Utah Const. art. I, § 22, is substantive and not procedural. Also, it is well established that Utah Const.
art. I, § 22, is not self-executing.
Any reliance which appellants may give to
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P.2d
1037 (1950), as support for the issuance of an injunction is misplaced. In Hurst v. Hiqhway Dep't, supra,
an application for an injunction on a theory of nuisance was denied. This court stated at 397 P.2d 74:
We have concluded as indicated in this decision
regardless of what may have been said in the case
of Shaw v. Salt Lake County. ...

Also, the propriety of an injunction issued
against the individual members of the Utah State
Road Commission is no longer at issue in the instant
case because the complained of acts, i.e., the construction of an access control fence and guard rail,
are already an accomplished fact. This is admitted
in appellants' complaint and brief.
The inconsistency between those decisions
which do not allow personal liability for damages,
Hiorst v. Whittenburg, supra; mandamus to compel eminent domain proceedings, Sprinqville Bankinq Co. v. Burton, supra, Fairclouqh v. Salt Lake
County, supra; the dismissal of a counterclaim on
the grounds that a counterclaimant could not be in

a better position than a plaintiff, State v. Parker,
supra. and allowing that which appellant seeks in
the instant case is obvious and intolerable.
CONCLUSION

Based on the absence of a direct physical appropriation of appellants' property and the applicability of the rule that sovereign immunity precludes
judicial review of consequential damages such as
alleged in the instant case, respondents submit that
the dismissal of appe1lants' complaint should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

